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ISSUE 1, DISCOVERY
Mark prevailed on the District Appeal issue of extreme cruelty and is proceeding at the
Magistrate level and is seeking clarification on discovery because he has been falsely accused to
be vexatious. So for those concerned about vexatious acts and in the interest of Justice, this
Supreme Court could rule that Mark shall or shall not ask Julie questions surrounding her false
allegations made. Judge Williamson stated Mark could only ask questions about Julie's false
claims if she (Julie) made them under oath. It seems odd why Mark cannot inquire about false
allegations Julie has made not under oath. T. p.20 p.238-24. (Trial, T, p. 58 (230 -6) IRCP Rule
36 (a), 6 Objections (Trial, T, p. 58 (230 -6). Judge Scott calls this point 'moot', Cross Appellant
claims they are relevant and unresolved.
Mr. Ludwig not wanting clarification by this Supreme Court is at odds with his filed a
Motion to refer Mark to be deemed vexatious for asking questions about Julie's pattern of abuse.
It is claimed that Mr. Ludwig doesn't want these issues remedied by the Supreme Court because
it would expose his perjury and abuse of process. The Cross Respondents Brief does not respond
or deny the claim that Julie has a pattern of making false claims.
Mr. Ludwig had Exhibit 34 entered into evidence on August 3rd , 2016, knowingly
alleging false claims on Mark. This abuse of process is relevant to the number of other
irregularities set forth. How this exhibit was not put on the standard Clerks Record is irregular in
light of facts of the case.
Idaho Statute regarding what can be included in Discovery: Idaho Code 32-923(1) (h).
Stockdale v. Stockdale, 643 P.2d 82 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) and regarding spousal abuse is a
relevant, Crowe v. Crowe, 602 So. 2d 441 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
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ISSUE 2, MOTION IN LIMINE
This case started May 6t\ 2016, on October 26t\ 2016 the claim of public policy and
insurable interest regarding life insurance was filed. No mention by Judge Williamson in the
hearing or the Order on Motion in Limine that this was taken up Sua Sponte; Clerks R, p. 268 R,
p. 274. Mark agrees that Judge Williamson can take the matter up at any time when applying
IRCP and Idaho Statutes. This doesn't explain why no Notice of Hearing identifying the Motion
was signed or why an Order to Shorten Time was not signed. Idaho Rules of Family Law
Procedure Rule 501. Motion Practice Rule 6 supports the claim made on appeal by Mark that this
Motion in Limine should be denied and is not 'moot'.
ISSUE 3, FRAUD BY INDUCEMENT
Mark is asking this Supreme Court to overturn the decision of the trial court, claiming
that the Findings of Facts of the trial are significantly erroneous. The Cross Respondent Brief
fails to argue the Fraud by Inducement by way of 1) Law 2) Credibility 3) Errors in Findings of
Facts 4) Facts of the case ignored and 5) Irregularities in Lower Courts procedure.
IRREGULARITIES AT LOWER COURT
Mark presented in his Respondent Cross-Appeal Brief several examples of ethics and,
or Cannon Violations or irregularities the Cross Respondents Brief does not argue or respond.
•

Judge Williamson ordered Court Clerk to not record a hearing on November 1st, 2016.
Judge Scott did not address this matter at the District Court Appeal level.

•

Judge Williamson claims that extreme cruelty is not relevant and dissuading Mark form
pursuing extreme cruelty. Trial, T, p. 204 (816, line 19-23)

THE COURT: Okay. Don't say her abuse. I have not heard evidence of her being
CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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abusive towards you. So when you say those things, then it just turns me off. I quit
listening. So you need to stick to these issues.
The above statement made by Judge Williamson is at odds with the amount of objective
evidence of financial abuse; verbal and physical abuse. Exhibit 34. T.p.24.pp.96-98. Julie
pointing a gun at Mark and threatening to kill him re just one of many examples. Also,
Judge Williamson claiming that proving extreme cruelty will get you nothing. August 3rd ,
2016 hearing Judge Williamson stated in response to MDC stating T, p 189

•

Mr. Colafranceschi: And all those that pertain to the allegation of extreme cruelty by
Mark in his counterclaim aren't relevant
Judge Williamson: It's not relevant. Because what we're dealing with, the issue here is
the validity of the prenuptial agreement, division of any community property, if any
existed, and a divorce. There are no children. Issues of extreme cruelty would certainly
be relevant if there were children involved. So that gets you nothing that I can see. It gets
you nothing.
Allegations that Mr. Ludwig knowingly made a false affidavit seeking Mark to be

referred to as vexatious, while Judge Williamson knowing that the questions alleged as vexatious
are not.
•

Judge Williamson protecting Julie from answering discovery questions by limiting

Mark's ability to ask Julie about false allegations to only Julie's false statements made under
oath. T. p.20 p.238-240. (See Issue 1, Discovery)
•

Judge Williamson surprising witness Carol Griffith to testify telephonically and then

not enquiring about the fraud by inducement.
•

Other irregularities mentioned in Respondents Cross Appeal Brief.

CASE LAW
The Lower Courts and The Cross Resp, Brief are both erroneously claiming a premarital
agreement contract must be in writing and is not voidable in part due to fraud by inducement.
Indeed, "[ f]raud vitiates the specific terms of the agreement and can provide a basis for
demonstrating that the parties agreed to something apart from or in addition to the written
CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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documents." Aspiazu, 139 Idaho at 551, 82 P.3d at 833. Therefore, generally, "the theory
is that because of fraud, there was no contract." Utilities Eng'g Inst. v. Criddle, 65 Idaho
201, 209, 141 P.2d 981, 985 (1943). This is the case "whether the fraud enters into the
execution of the contract or is antecedent to it" and "regardless of any stipulation to the
contrary contained in the contract." Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 51 Idaho at 168, 4
P.2d 657 at 659. Accordingly, fraud in the inducement applies to the alleged facts in this
case. Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 419 P. 3d 1139 - Idaho: Supreme Court 2018
The case below in which wife signed an agreement 4 days before marriage with fraudulent
promises was overturned:
In Cioffi-Petrakis, the wife contended that her husband had reneged on his oral promise
to tear up their prenuptial agreement once she had children made shortly before the prenuptial agreements' execution (the parties now have two sons and a daughter). That
promise was not referenced in the parties' written agreement entered just four days before
the parties' marriage. Moreover, the parties had disclaimed reliance upon oral statements
by either party, a relatively standard provision in the agreement, itself. Nevertheless, the
Second Department agreed with Justice Falanga that the evidence supported the wife's
claim that she had been fraudulently induced to accept the deal.
Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting
Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.an agreement between spouses or prospective
spouses may be invalidated if the party challenging the agreement demonstrates that it
was the product of fraud, duress, or other inequitable conduct (see Christian v Christian,
42 NY2d 63, 73 [1977]; Petracca v Petracca, 101 AD3d 695 [2012]; Weinstein v
Weinstein, 36 AD3d 797, 798 [2007]; Lombardi v Lombardi, 235 AD2d 400 [1997]).
Here, the Supreme Court reasonably resolved credibility issues in favor of the plaintiff,
and its determination that the defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiff to execute the
prenuptial agreement was supported by the evidence. With respect to the material facts
underlying the plaintiffs claim, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs testimony
was "credible," "convincing," "unequivocal," and consistent with "additional
corroborative evidence," and that any "inconsistencies" in her testimony related to
"insignificant" matters. By contrast, the Supreme Court found the defendant's "credibility
to be suspect," due in part, to his "patent evasiveness." The Supreme Court's credibility
findings are supported by the record. The plaintiffs claim, in this case, rested largely on
the credibility of the parties, and we decline to disturb the Supreme Court's determination
with respect thereto (see Reid v Reid, 57 AD3d 960 [2008]). On the particular facts of this
case, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiff sustained her burden of
establishing grounds to set aside the prenuptial agreement (cf Petracca v Petracca, l O1
AD3d at 695).
However, "[a]greements between spouses, unlike ordinary business contracts, involve a
fiduciary relationship requiring the utmost of good faith" (Christian v Christian, 42
N.Y.2d 63, 72 [1977]; see Matter of Greiff, 92 N.Y.2d 341,345 [1998]; O'Malley v
O'Malley, 41 A.D.3d 449,451 [2007]; Manes v Manes, 277 A.D.2d 359,361 [2000]).
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The lower courts do not address or emphasize the credibility of the parties thus ignoring
an important aspect of competent findings of facts, nor does it consider that all the waivers in the
premarital agreement are voidable if fraud exists.

CREDIBILITY
The Cross Respondents Brief did not dispute that Julie was not a credible witness, nor did
it argue that Julie committed perjury. The Respondent Cross Appeal Brief outlines 15 items
concerning perjury and there is no rebuttable from Cross Respondent.
Also, it was testified to and not refuted that Julie stated, "I'll do whatever it takes to

make sure he gets nothing. I don't care what it costs." T. p.102. p.406, 408, T. p.106. p.431, T.
p.254-5. p.1016, 1017,1018, T.p.370. p.137-139 T.p.376. p.160 T.p.378. p.166. It was also not
refuted that when Julie and Mark are on the outs she makes false accusations. Exh. Volume 2
p.1891- DefExh. 5:

"When I get scared and angry I was out and try to hurt Mark. When you and Durena tell
me stories I only agree and make up more about Mark and try to hurt Mark. I can't do it
anymore. Nobody deserves that!! .. I will not make up any more stories to please everyone
that is out to get him and destroy him. I was not raised to be like this."
In this case, motives, failure to recall, and perjury are clear and convincing yet ignored by
the lower courts and the Cross Respondent. In case-law cited above, when overturning premarital
agreements involving oral promise, creditability is the cornerstone of decisions made by the
court. Mark established and proved credible and consistent in testimony even while Judge
Williamson took it upon herself to impeach Mark by calling Ms. Griffith by telephone to testify.
The lower courts not addressing creditability of witnesses, combined with the
overwhelming amount of facts ignored makes it obvious to a reasonable person that the Judges
have a personal bias, and are abusing their discretion.
When deciding whether the evidence of a witness is credible by examining the difference
CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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between recollection and reconstruction of events by the person testifying, and considers how to
conclude based on evidence and reasoning, it is important to address all relevant evidence and
testimony, inconsistent statements, impeachment, and motive. In this case, the Trier of fact did
not apply these factors.

FINDINGS OF FACT IN ERROR

Arguments ignored by Cross Respondent Brief and errors in Findings of the Lower court
include:
1. The Trier of fact claims on R.p.296, p. 6 in the Findings section, that Julie denies she
made such promises. An important fact in Fraud by inducement is proving that a promise was

made. The Trier of fact ignoring that Julie did promise Mark, is no small error of fact-finding.
Ironically, the transcript of Julie making the promise can be found on R.p.298, p. 8. The Trier of
fact also ignores that Julie could not remember if she made the oral promise and that Julie
testified that she might have made the promise. Both promises were made before marriage and in
the year 2015.
2. The Trier of fact then states R.p.296, p. 6. "Even

if Julie promised Mark would have a

community interest in homes, there were no homes purchased together by Julie and Mark".
Trier of fact ignored third party ownership and case law. Also, Judge Williamson ignores
Question #4 that she posed herself and was answered in the Findings of Facts and Conclusion of
Law by both Mark and Mr. Ludwig.
1. If the Court were to find fraud in the inducement, would the premarital
agreement be set aside in its entirety or would the community property provision
in the premarital agreement be amended to give Mr. Colafranceschi a one-half
interest in the increase in the value of the house?
2. Does fraud apply to a promise to do something in the future?
3. In the summary judgment decision, the Court allowed the claims offraud in
the inducement and equitable estoppel to continue. I believe the equitable remedy
only applies if there is no remedy in law. Mr. Colafranceschi has a remedy in

CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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law. Therefore the equitable remedy should be dismissed. Please address whether
the Court's interpretation is correct.
4. I believe Julie argues that she does not own the house. The trust owns it. She
listed the trust as her asset in the premarital agreement. Can Mr.
Colafranceschi rely on that representation and believe that Julie, therefore,
owns the house because the trust is hers. My understanding is that the trust is
irrevocable. I understand there are four trustees of the trust, including Julie. I
understand that if Julie wanted to give Mr. Colafranceschi a deeded interest in
the house the remaining three trustees would decide. Is it necessary that he
have a deeded interest in order to require her to pay him one half of the
increase in value.
Judge Williamson in her findings ignores competent and factual aspects to question #4
answered by Mark. Julie is the sole beneficiary and has never been denied anything by her
trustees. Trial Tr. 135, pg. 540. It was never implied or testified that Julie was not the owner of
the Trust
Trail T, p. 131. Judge Williamson asked Ms. Foster specifics about the trust. She asked
that if Julie requested $500,000 from the trust, would it in fact be Julie's own money. The answer
is yes. Ms. Foster has worked for the family for 35 years. Any draws or requests Julie has made
have never been denied. Ms. Foster also stated any court order would be respected by the
trustees.
Mark's Findings of facts, Aug. p. 31-32, provides a remedy in case oflaw regarding
third-party ownership citing: Joint party ownership being divided, Krinsky v. Krinsky,
618 NY.S.2d 36 (NY. App. Div. 1994 and Legal ownership versus beneficial ownership
Upchurch v. Upchurch, 468 S.E.2d 61 (NC. Ct. App. 1996.
Any interest held by either spouse in an irrevocable trust can be divisible property, just as
stock in corporation can be divisible property. McGinn v. McGinn, 540 S.E.2d 604 (Ga.
2001); Fox v. Fox, 592 N.W.2d 541 (N.D. 1999) (trial court erred by refusing to consider
trust as divisible asset); Caccamise v. Caccamise, 747 A.2d 221 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2000), cert. denied, 753 A.2d 2 (Md. 2000); In re Marriage of Jones, 973 P.2d 361 (Or.
Ct. App. 1999), reconsideration denied, 981 P.2d 338 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), review denied,
987 P.2d 515 (Or. 1999); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 996 P.2d 5 (Wyo. 2000) (portion
of husband's ranch held in trust for his benefit was still divisible property).
3. Mark's Findings of Facts. Aug. p.22, he outlines the numerous perjury and creditability

CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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issues not addressed in Judge Williamson's findings. IRCP 52 (a)(l),(7),(b)(c).
4. Mark's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification, Aug. p.51. Mark asks Judge
Williamsons to clarify and reconsider her findings on Julie's oral promise. She provides
no clarification or correction. Mark asks for Clarification on Julie's creditability on the
same page. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52. (a)(l),(7),(b)(c).
5. In the last paragraph on Aug. p.51 Mark asks Judge Williamson to clarify the issue of
extreme cruelty. Judge Williamson does not provide clarification. IRCP 52 (a)(l ),(7),(b).
6. Julie testified that she did not remember if she made a verbal promise before signing the
contract. This was ignored by the Courts. IRCP 52 (a)(l ),(7),(b ).
7. The premarital agreement was signed 6 days before marriage. The likelihood that Julie
promised equity to get Mark to sign the agreement was not addressed.
8. The couple's discussion in purchasing a home indicated that it would be their home. This
fact was ignored in Findings. Ex. Vol. 2 p. 1917-1935 (DefExh. 8).
9. Mark substantially improved not only landscaping but another 40 significant permanent
improvements at the home. These were downplayed in the Findings of Facts.
The Trier of fact did not account for Julie's abuse to Mark. When Mark left the
matrimonial home Julie indicated that Mark had no equity in their home. She terminated
his Whitetail membership and made numerous false allegations about Mark. Exh,
Volume 2 p.1891. Julie wanted Mark to return however, Mark did not feel safe or secure
under the circumstances. Mark was unwilling to live in a marriage of inequality. Mark
was unwilling to move forward with the promise of 2012 being violated in December
2014. Mark was ultimately agreeable, however, to resolving matters with a marriage
counselor to make it safe to move back to their home.

CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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10. It was agreed in counseling that conditions be met for Mark to return. 1. That he receive
2500.00 a month to meet his needs because Julie did not want him to work. 2. That the
Whitetail membership would not be revoked during the separation, or during argument.
3. Equity in the home. Significant is that Julie performed and followed through on the
promise of monthly support and continued to promise the equity. Also significant is
Judge Williamsons' failure to view this as very important.
11. Mark returned to the matrimonial home with Julie's promise that he was safe. When
Mark asked Julie to sign the post-marital agreement she indicated she would but it would
have to wait because her attorney Ira was traveling outside the country. Julie would
reassure and tell Mark that he had nothing to worry about when he asked when the
agreement would be signed. "I am sorry you don't trust me" Exhibit Vol. 2, p, 1961 Exh,
172. This dragged on for over a year. This is again significant in that Judge Williamson's
refusal to account for these facts allows for her to make erroneous findings. Julie
performed on the agreed monthly payment.
12. Judge Williamson did not want to hear about Julie's financial abuse, her physical abuse,
or the false allegations she inflicted upon Mark, even after Judge Williamson admitted
exhibit 34 of Julie pointing a gun on Mark. Then Judge Williamson later telling Mark not
to claim is Julies abusive because it turns her off..
13. The Trier of facts did not consider Julie's pattern of committing perjury. As it relates to
Judge Williamson's claims that make proving extreme cruelty would get him nothing.
14. The Trier of facts did not consider the number of times Julie failed to recall basic
information that a normal person should recall, such as the substance in her will.
15. The Trier of fact ignored facts from exhibit 100, and 101 indicating that the couple had

CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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agreed and promised certain things as conditions for Mark to return to the home.
16. The Trier of fact ignored the testimony and exhibits by Mark clearly stating that he would
not have moved back into the home if Julie didn't fulfill the promise.
17. Judge Williamson's Order denying Mark's Motion to Reconsider R.313. It doesn't
address the request to clarify erroneous findings.

RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS BY CROSS RESPONDENT
1. The Cross Respondents Brief claims, p. 13, that Mark failed to address the first two
components of fraud. The Cross Respondents does not address the evidence (that the lower
courts ignored) that Mark provided that satisfies these first two elements of fraud as set forth:
Element (1): a representation: The Cross Respondents Briefp.6 claims that 'Mark wanted a
share of the equity in the home and Julie would not sign the document he provided'. But she

did continue to promise and would tell Mark to just trust her. While the brief ignores the fact that
Julie made the promise that she would sign the agreement before Mark returned to the home,
then she said she would sign it when her Dallas attorney (Ira) returned. Julie continued to
promise and then stall or delay by making excuses. Cross Respondent ignores the fact that Julie
testified that it was possible she made the promise before the premarital agreement was signed.
Julie promised equity in the home, before marriage, when the couple purchased a home together
and stated that it would be held in trust, then again she promised equity in the home in the year
2015. Also ignored is Julie wanting Mark to make an offer on 'their' home.
(2) Element: its falsity; (with 4 th Element. The speaker's knowledge of its falsity). Julie
admittedly never intended on giving Mark equity. She stated that she never talked to attorneys,
and never intended to fulfill the promise if Mark left the marriage; "a false representation is a
cornerstone to action in fraud." Julie promised Mark she would execute it. The Cross

CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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Respondent brief p.13 uses slippery wording. It claims Julie never made an oral promise, while
the evidence shows the fact that she did (see Def Exhibit 100). Furthered by Carol Griffith in Def
ex. 101 confirming the same after Mark moved back in.
The oral promise was also validated and proven beyond a reasonable doubt by both
Mark's testimony and Julie's failing to recall if she made a verbal promise. Julie also testified
that it was possible she made the promise.
T, p. 243 (pp.969-971)
Q. COLAFRANCESCHI: Did you agree to, before February 23, in anyway, written or oral,
stating that Mark would get equity in the house minus the initial down payment of $675,000?
Did you ever agree to that?
NEUSTADT: I don't know if I said that or not. If I said it, it was, again, just so you would leave
me alone, and I never signed anything that you gave me.
Q. COLAFRANCESCHI: Do you think it would cause a problem as a condition to move back
into the house with respect to marital therapy and with respect to us as a couple, that you not
having an intention to fulfill that obligation would cause problems in the months to follow? Yes
orno?
NEUSTADT: I think we had a lot of problems.
Q. COLAFRANCESCHI: Please answer the question. Do you think you not intending to fulfill
your obligation on equity in the home and execute that NEUSTADT: It was not my equity to give. I told you, and I have always told you, you putQ. COLAFRANCESCHI: Please answer the question.
NEUSTADT: I don't know. It's not my equity to give. I don't even own the house.
Q. COLAFRANCESCHI: The question is, with you not intending to fulfill that agreement prior
to me moving in, do you think it was going to cause problems in our relationship moving
forward, me living in that home?
NEUSTADT: I guess so.
Julie above claiming she may be made the promise so Mark would leave her alone is
ridiculous when you take into account wanting Mark to return to the home, and Julie admitting to
making false allegations and being abusive. Judge Williamson did not address this.
Julie testified that she never asked the question to her trustees. It is fair to conclude that
she did not even know if her request to equity would be agreed to by estate trustees and more
importantly that she did not intend to even try to fulfill her promise.
Judge Williamson steered Mark away from inquiring to Julie regarding the promises and
CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF
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the agreement.
Trial, T, p. 244-245 (Transcript 976-978)
Q. BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Did you think it was a problem not having the intention of
fulfilling the postnuptial agreement in future months of the relationship?
NEUSTADT: I said I guess so.
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: It was a -- you see it as a potential problem.
NEUSTADT: We had huge problems, so that was part of it, I guess
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: And you testified yesterday that you never contacted your father to
discuss your agreement with Mr. Colafranceschi.
NEUSTADT: I don't believe I talked to my father.
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: So isn't it true that after I moved back in that you made several
promises and excuses for not signing the postnuptial agreement?
NEUSTADT: I don't know what excuses. I didn't sign it. I didn't sign it. So why didn't you
leave? I didn't sign it
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Did you make any excuses or further promises that you were
going to get it done after I moved in?
NEUSTADT: I don't remember what I said. I don't know. I don't know.
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Is it possible that you made promises or excuses NEUSTADT: Give me an example. I don't know what you're talking about.
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: I think the question is clear.
NEUSTADT: I don't know. I'm telling you I don't know.
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Did you state, Ira (Dallas Attorney) is out of the country for over a
month So I can't do this now.
NEUSTADT: Ira was traveling.

Above, Julie does not deny making excuses to promises to drag Mark along.
On Cross-Examination:
Trial, T,p.245 (p.979 line 13-15)
LUDWIG: Q. Were you agreeable to him having any equity in the house?
NEUSTADT: No.
In the preceding questioning of Julie, Mr. Ludwig assumes that Julie could give Mark
equity. Julie answering 'no' implies that she owned the home and could share her ownership
equity.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. Isn't it true that during the time of separation from
December 2014 until approximately March -- or, sorry, February 2014 Mr. Colafranceschi lived
separately from your residence?
THE COURT: What month are you talking about? March?
BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Well, basically, January and February of 2015, Mr.
Colafranceschi lived separate from Ms. N eustadt after leaving the residence. Is that correct?
A BY NEUSTADT: I believe, yeah.

CROSS APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF

Page 13

Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Wasn't it true that a condition on returning to the residence
was an agreement for equity in the home for not being able to kick Mr. Colafranceschi out of the
house, not being able to remove him as a member of Whitetail?
A BY NEUSTADT: That was what you said, and there was nothing that was ever signed.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. But did you agree to that verbally?
A BY NEUSTADT: I don't remember.
Julie never denies that Mark moving back in was contingent on an agreement being
verbally promised. All Julie can do now is a claim she didn't sign anything.
Trial Tr.p.201 (803)
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. Julie, isn't it true that this is the first time in February
of 2015 that Mark actually asked to modify or change the existing prenuptial agreement?
A BY NEUSTADT: I don't know. I don't recall.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. And it's your stance that you don't recall the $2500 in
spousal support if I were to move out during separation?
A BY NEUSTADT: No.
Judge Williamson's finding of fact established Julie did pay Mark $2000 a month Feb
2015 to April 2016 - consistent with Mark's testimony. Julie's testimony above is inconsistent
and misleading to the question of performance made by Julie in fulfilling her promise to pay
monthly support to Mark.
Trial Tr. p. 202 (807)
Q. BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Did you have Mr. Silverman, your attorney from Dallas,
look at this postnuptial agreement?
THE COURT: And you're talking about Exhibit C?
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: C as in Charles.
A BY NEUSTADT: I don't know ifhe ever saw it or not, no.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Did you forward it or discuss it with your father?
A BY NEUSTADT: No. I thought you would do that.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. So it's safe to say you had no intention ifthere was a
verbal agreement to honor and put it into a postnuptial agreement?
A BY NEUSTADT: I never signed anything. I figured if you wanted it so bad, you're so good at
calling my dad and causing drama that you would call him.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: And so prior to that, in February 2015
Email of February 23 rd , 2015 in which Neustadt emails to Mark that her Dallas Attorney
(Ira) will have to look at it when he returns. Julie never made an attempt to validating the falsity
of her promise, while emails and testimony prove that Julie induced Mark.
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Trial Tr.p.223 (890-891)
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: I had asked a simple question did she state that she didn't want to
deal with the postnuptial agreement in February 2015 and just wait until her dad dies. That was
the question. Yes or no?
THE COURT: If you can just answer it yes or no.
A. BY NEUSTADT: I don't recall ifl did or not, and you probably have been waiting a long
time for my dad to die. You were pretty obsessed with when my dad was going to die.
Q. BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Didn't I provide you a recording with myself and with
Carol, of just Carol and myself, stating that, I'm not good with that, and this needs to be
processed now. That's not the way to do things is to wait for somebody to die?
A. BY NEUSTADT: No, I haven't heard any of your recordings with Carol, and I didn't know
that you were recording me when I was with Carol.
Q. BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Did Scot provide you with the discovery that I provided
him over the last six months?
A. BY NE UST ADT: Yes.
Q. BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: He provided you with audio recordings and videos? I'm
sure he did.
NEUSTADT: No. Here is the thing with the videos and some of the audios, they were too much
to handle. So I just asked with your sex video and everything else, I asked not to be sent those
anymore. I just -- I didn't want to see them. I didn't want to listen to them. So I asked
specifically for them not to be sent.
Q. BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: So it's your testimony that you don't recall claiming just
wait until my dad dies for the postnuptial agreement?
NEUSTADT: No, I don't recall. And those with your words, and that's what you would always
say.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: And you're saying that under oath that
NEUSTADT: You would always say it. And then finally, like you don't stop. So finally,
sometimes I would just say what you wanted to hear. I never signed anything. Nothing was ever
changed. I never signed anything.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. Ifwe go to the second page of Exhibit 4Trial Tr. p.224, (893)
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Could you read the email from March 6 in which Mark
Peters responds to both you and I.
A BY NEUSTADT: Which page?
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Page 2, Mark Peters, March 6 to both yourself and me.
A BY NEUSTADT: As to the houses?
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Yes.
A BY NEUSTADT: As to the houses, one way to do it, if the lenders would let you, would be to
title the property in yours and Julie's names as joint live tenants and the children as the
[inaudible]. Alternatively, you and Julie could form a trust to own the houses, which each of you
being able to live in the houses until you die and children being the beneficiaries. "Of course, I
don't know if that screws things up if the two of you divorce. My thinking to do it is this way, is
that each of you could still have your wills the way you want them without being obligated to the
other regarding what you put in there. Talk about it over with Audrey. As long as Julie doesn't
have a problem with putting the life insurance provision in 2 there, I can do that. "Question,
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whole, universal or term policy. I think the longest term out there is 30 5 years, which means
Julie would be 40 -- or 71 when it expires. The cost of another $2 million at that age could be
prohibitive. I think you and Julie need to discuss the details a little bit."
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: And did we discuss the details after that email was sent to
both you and myself?
A BY NEUSTADT: I don't recall.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: You don't recall?
A BY NEUSTADT: No.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: So there's -- would you say there's a likelihood that we
discussed it based on the fact that we were getting married in 20 days?
A BY NEUSTADT: I don't know. You would just go on, and a lot of times I just wouldn't even
listen to you. So I don't recall half of our conversations.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: So it's possible you just said stuff to shut me up? Is that
possible?
A BY NEUSTADT: That's possible.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. Is it possible that you were stressed during this
process and were concerned about your family insisting on this against your will?
NEUSTADT: No. It was not against my will. It was always ifwe ever were to get married, the
deal was that we were going to get a prenup.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. So that e-mail of March 6, after you received that
email, did you discuss that with anybody that was in charge of your finances?
A BY NEUSTADT: I do not recall.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. Do you think that it would be important that you
discussed these matters of households, trusts, and life insurance with people who make your
financial decisions?
A BY NEUSTADT: I really wasn't that worried about the prenup because, seriously, I honestly
thought that was it. We were going to be married. I had gone through one marriage. I thought
we were going to be together.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: And so you said, Don't worry about it, and you promised
that the house would be mine?
A BY NEUSTADT: I never promised you the house was going to be yours. I never signed
anything.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: What did you say? I'm not saying signed. I'm saying, what
did you say?
A BY NEUSTADT: I never had that put in the prenup. It was never put in the prenup
Julie would not testify that she never made a verbal promise on equity before marriage.
Even when asked about the intentions of Mark Peter's email addressing the matter of future
homes Julie is evasive. Judge Williamson does not account for this.
Then on (Trial Tr. p.1190: 1-10)
JUDGE WILLIAMSON: If we get to a divorce, you get half equity.
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: I'll play it again. I get half equity. Ifwe get divorced, we sell it or
we get an appraisal and I get half. Play it?
JUDGE WILLIAMSON: Play what it says.
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MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Okay. (Audio played and then stopped.
JUDGE WILLIAMSON: Okay, I've heard enough. So this conversation 0nFebruary 24, 2015,
was the day after you moved back into the house?
MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: I believe I moved in on 22nd
Trial Tr. 135, Pg 540 - Julie's Employee of 35 years and Trustee testified there has never been a
reasonable draw denied.
Q. BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: How many times has the trust denied Julie's request for an
extra draw?
A. FOSTER: I don't remember us ever Mark was separately asked by Judge Williamson and Scot Ludwig why Mark stayed in
the marriage after he returned on February 2ot\ 2015. Mark explained in testimony he was
'promised and promised' and reassured he could 'trust' Julie. Mark's creditably testified that the
marriage was mostly good (80% ), however when Julie would have a behavior incident it would
result in conflict, then back to the status quo. Trial, T, p.269 (1076). The Lower Courts show
bias, and ignoring this in its Findings.
Cross Respondent Brief cites Dungan(sp ). Dunagan v. Dunagan - rejecting partial
performance in an oral premarital agreement.
Idaho recognizes the doctrine of partial performance, which is an exception to the statute
of frauds that permits a court to compel the specific performance of an agreement not in
writing that has been partly performed. LC. § 9-504; see also Simons v. Simons, 134
Idaho 824, 827, 11 P.3d 20, 23 (2000); Bear Island, Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125
Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994).
In Simons v. Simons, (2000);
Under the doctrine of part performance, when an agreement to convey real property fails
to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the agreement may nevertheless be
specifically enforced when the purchaser has partly performed the agreement. Bear Island
Water Association, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994). "What
constitutes part performance must depend upon the particular facts of each case and the
sufficiency of particular acts is matter oflaw." Id. at 722, 874 P.2d at 533;
(citing Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 381 P.2d 802 (1963)). "The most important acts
which constitute a sufficient part performance are actual possession, permanent and
valuable improvements and these two combined." Roundy v. Waner, 98 Idaho 625,
629, 570 P.2d 862, 866 (1977). The acts constituting part performance must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence, and they must also be definitely referable to the alleged
oral contract. Boesiger, 85 Idaho at 557, 381 P.2d at 805.
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The Cross Respondent bringing to this case the issue of partial performance confuses the
issue by ignoring performance by Mark in attaining possession, permanent and valuable
improvements performed by Mark.
2. The claim by The Cross Respondents Brief p.16, claims that "Judge Scott was also correct

that there was no fraudulent inducement by Julie to get Mark to return to the Osprey home
because Mark knew that to modify the prenuptial agreement there had to be a writing signed by
Julie before the amendment would be enforceable, and Julie refused to sign the agreement. " The
logic and deductive reasoning above fail the test. The Cross Respondent Brief ignoring: the
falsity of promises (Element #2), the stalling, Julie's claim she would contact her Dallas attorney
(Ira), and ongoing promises, show clearly that the lower Courts did not competently address that
Julie intended to fraudulently induce Mark.
The Cross Respondent and Lower Court saying Julie didn't sign the agreement while
ignoring that she promised and kept on promising she would, and or telling Mark he had nothing
to worry about, just trust. If she did not promise, why would she stall by claiming she needed to
wait for her attorney to return, then promise she would get it done when she went to Dallas or
Colorado Springs,- or tell Mark, "I sorry you don't trust me", Exhibit Vol. 2, p, 1961 Exh. 172.
It was well established and ignored by the Lower Courts and Cross Respondents Brief

that Mark would NOT have returned to the home if the equity in the home was not agreed to.
Mr. Ludwig claims that Julie testified that she never agreed to give Mark equity in the
home. In his brief, acting as an officer of the court, he does not acknowledge that Julie did not
recall if she made a verbal promise. Nor does he acknowledge that on Exh 100 Julie makes the
promise. Mr. Ludwig, knowing this falsity, instructed Julie to commit perjury by repeating she
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did not sign anything, while both Julie and Mr. Ludwig knew otherwise. If Julie has claimed that
she told Mr. Ludwig that she may have made the oral promise, this is a serious issue.
3. The Cross Respondent Brief claims Mark and Julie did not purchase a home together,
and that the home was purchased by the trust. The Cross Respondent Brief fails to address third
party ownership, with Julie being the sole beneficiary, in addition to the fact that that Julie
instructed and worked with Mark on making an offer on their matrimonial home.
Ex. Vol. 2 p. 1917-1935 (DefExh.8) All of below text between Julie & Mark January 14t\ 2013
NEUSTADT: We need to make an offer (Osprey Home)
COLAFRANCESCHI: I think 630,000
NEUSTADT: Might b to low. Was thinking 640
February 1i\ 2013
NEUSTADT:" Can you make an offer on the house. Only house kids won't have to share
rooms. We can do the hottubbing landscaping etc and make it our home and something to be
proud of.
The above was not mentioned in the Findings of Fact or rebuttal. That performance and
intent are clear and unambiguous.
4. The Cross Respondent Brief claims "Julie had no authority to transfer or liquidate"
property. This statement is not true in light of the testimony of Jeanne Foster and Julie Neustadt
as outlined. If the Cross Respondent is correct, why would Julie agree to equity to Mark
(Defendant Exhibit 100 and other times), And or why would Julie claim she might have made
the promise. Nor does Cross Respondent confront the fact that Julie has never been denied a
request she has made upon her trustees - ever. Furthermore, Julie testified that she never asked
the question to her trustees. So how can the Cross Respondent Brief claim that Julie has no
authority to transfer when the record shows otherwise.
Trial Tr. 135, Pg 540 - Julie's Employee of 35 years and Trustee testified there has never been
a reasonable draw denied.
Q. BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: How many times has the trust denied Julie's request for an
extra draw?
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A. FOSTER: I don't remember us ever Trial Tr. p.196 (782)
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Julie, you said earlier at the beginning of your testimony
that you have no transfer interest in the 408 Osprey View property. Is that correct, is that what
you said?
A BY NEUSTADT: Correct.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: And the next question was, are you able to transfer that?
A BY NEUSTADT: No.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: Have you ever asked?
A BY NEUSTADT: No.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: So how do you know that you're not able to if you have
never asked?
BY NE UST ADT: Well, it would be a unanimous vote.
Q BY MR. COLAFRANCESCHI: But you never asked. Correct?
A BY NEUSTADT: No, I haven't asked. There was no need to ask.
JUDGE WILLIAMSON: He wants to know if she dies is the trust part of her estate. Would it
pay a damage claim of $2 million in the event that she didn't have that life insurance policy in
effect at the time of her death?
FOSTER (TRUSTEE): If that was in the prenup an it was agreed upon, would the trust pay?
JUDGE WILLIAMSON: Um-hmm.
FOSTER (TRUSTEE): I'm assuming it would be - part of her estate would be obligated to pay
that.

Trail T, p. 131.
Judge Williamson asked Ms. Foster specifics about the trust. She asked if Julie requested
$500,000 from the trust it would be Julie's own money. Ms. Foster has worked for the family for
35 years. Any draws or requests Julie has made have never been denied.

Trail T, p. 135-6 The question was asked if Julie wanted to give Mark a couple hundred
thousand for his equity would it be granted. When Ms. Foster was being evasive, she was
asked what the trust did when Julies home went into foreclosure and she needed
$100,000 for Idaho First Bank.
Julie's employee of 35 years claims not ever recalling a denial of a request from Julie.
And further any reasonable request would be granted. Fair to say a judgment or court order
would be as reasonable as the $100,000.00 Idaho First draw to avoid judgment and collection
upon Julie.
5. The Cross Respondent brief p. 17 states 'Mark asks this court in his concluding
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argument to award him an interest in the Osprey home. He offers no legal citation that would
show this Court would award Mark an interest in a property that is owned by a non-party in
the case". The Cross Respondent Brief claims that Mark offers no legal citation is incorrect: See
Respondent Cross Appeal Brief p.39:
"The law has recognized for centuries that ownership consists of two parts: the
legal title and the beneficial interest. Legal title is formal, nominal ownership: the right to
be listed as owned on deeds and other formal ownership records. The beneficial interest
is the right to the actual ultimate use of the asset. Legal title is generally ownership in a
court oflaw; the beneficial interest is ownership in a court of equity". Upchurch v.
Upchurch, 468 S.E.2d 61 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). Osprey property held in trust by Julie as
a trustee and is a benefit of Julie.
"Many assets, including especially such large assets as real estate, are owned by
more than one person. When the parties own property jointly with third persons, the court
is permitted to divide the interest owned by the spouses", Krinsky v. Krinsky, 618
N.Y.S.2d 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (dividing husband's one-half interest in a bank
account held jointly with his father).
Furthermore Cross Respondent had received Mark's Findings of Facts and answers to
question# 4 posed by Judge Williamson. Aug. p.32
Any interest held by either spouse in an irrevocable trust can be divisible
property, just as stock incorporation can be divisible property. McGinn v.
McGinn, 540 S.E.2d 604 (Ga. 2001); Fox v. Fox, 592 N.W.2d 541 (N.D. 1999)
(trial court erred by refusing to consider trust as a divisible asset); Caccamise v.
Caccamise, 747 A.2d 221 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000), cert. denied, 753 A.2d 2
(Md. 2000); In re Marriage of Jones, 973 P.2d 361 (Or. Ct. App. 1999),
reconsideration denied, 981 P.2d 338 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 987
P.2d 515 (Or. 1999); McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 996 P.2d 5 (Wyo. 2000)
(portion of husband's ranch held in trust for his benefit was still divisible
property).
6. The Cross Respondent brief questions how Mark came up with a $700,000 equity
stake. The Respondent Cross-Appeal p.46 states that an appraisal is necessary and Mark seeks
the Supreme Court to remand (to Magistrate) the value of the matrimonial home to be
determined by an appraisal. (Mark estimates his equity the value of the home to be $2,000,000
and his equity being @700,000).
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CONCLUSION
The Cross Appellant maintains the same conclusion as the Respondent Cross Appeal
Brief Filed on January 21st, 2020.

ATTORNEY FEES
Mark requests that the Supreme Court take notice of the Attorney fees section in
Respondent's Appeal Brief filed, concurrently with this Cross Appeal. The appeal seeks costs on
appeal in both District and Supreme Court cases. Date 3rd , Day of March 2020.
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Mark D. Colafranceschi

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Mark D. Colafranceschi, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this
Document: APPELLANT'S CROSS APPEAL BRIEF was sent to the following individuals by
email: IAR 34.1 On behalf of Himself Date 3rd , Day of March 2020: Idaho Court of Appeals Scot Ludwig and Daniel Miller.
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